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Sexual conflict is inescapable when two parents care for offspring, because providing
care is personally costly, while the benefits of successful reproduction are shared.
Previous models that treat parental investment as a continuous trait, with stable levels of
effort negotiated between parents over evolutionary or behavioral time, generally predict
that sexual conflict will lead to under-investment in the young, as each parent stands to
gain by leaving its partner to bear a greater share of the costs of care. More recently,
a model of parental investment as repeated discrete contributions suggested that a
more efficient outcome can be reached through parents adopting a simple strategy
of conditional cooperation by “turn-taking”: only investing after each contribution by
their partner. However, while empirical work suggests that parental visits are significantly
alternated in a number of natural systems, all examples thus far exhibit imperfect
turn-taking rather than the strict rule predicted by theory. To help bridge this gap, we
here present a more realistic mathematical model of parental turn-taking, incorporating
(i) errors in parents’ ability to monitor the contributions of their partner, (ii) time-dependent
costs and benefits of delivering care, (iii) differences between partners in payoffs (and
consequently in behavior), (iv) differences between partners in the accuracy with which
they can monitor one another’s behavior, and (v) shared costs of care. We illustrate how
the degree of conditional cooperation is influenced by each of these factors, and discuss
ways in which our model could be tested empirically.
Keywords: cooperation, family conflict, negotiation, parental care, reciprocity
INTRODUCTION
Parents that raise dependent young together face a much-studied conflict of interest, because both
stand to gain from successful reproduction, but (as with any common good) each does better if the
other bears a greater share of the costs this entails (Hardin, 1968; Trivers, 1972). This conflict is
typically thought to result in under-investment by parents, with negative consequences for their
offspring (Houston and Davies, 1985; Royle et al., 2002; McNamara et al., 2003; Lessells and
McNamara, 2012). More recently, Johnstone et al. (2014) suggested that if parental care is delivered
over a series of discrete “visits,” the conflict between parents provisioning young might be more
efficiently resolved through a simple form of conditional cooperation: turn-taking. Using a game-
theoretical model, they showed that if parents can monitor one another’s visits to the nest, then
selection might favor a strategy in which a parent who has once visited the young refrains from
doing so again until its partner has visited in turn. Such a strategy, which gives rise to strict turn-
taking when adopted by both parents, leads to an efficient resolution of the conflict between them
(i.e., both invest at a level that maximizes their total fitness payoff).
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Johnstone et al. (2014) also presented data on timing of nest
visits by great tit (Parus major) parents raising chicks together
that suggested a tendency toward turn taking, with parents
apparently reducing their own rate of visiting the nest while
waiting for their partner to visit. While the statistical methods
used to infer a process of active turn-taking have attracted some
discussion and controversy (Johnstone et al., 2016; Schlicht et al.,
2016; Santema et al., 2019), a number of other studies have
since found similar evidence of alternation in avian bi-parental
(Iserbyt et al., 2017, 2019; Leniowski and Wegrzyn, 2018)
and cooperatively breeding systems (Bebbington and Hatchwell,
2016; Koenig and Walters, 2016; Savage et al., 2017), though it is
also clear that such tendencies are not universal (see for example
Khwaja et al., 2017).
The model of Johnstone et al. (2014), however, relies on the
unrealistic assumption that parents can monitor one another’s
visits to the nest with perfect accuracy, which leads to the
equally unrealistic prediction that parents should exhibit “strict”
or “perfect” turn-taking, with each individual “refusing” to visit
twice in a row. By contrast, even those empirical studies which
have found strong tendencies toward alternation of visits do
not report strict turn-taking (Bebbington and Hatchwell, 2016;
Koenig and Walters, 2016; Iserbyt et al., 2017; Savage et al., 2017;
Wojczulanis-Jakubas et al., 2018). Indeed, Johnstone et al. (2014)
themselves found that great tit parents reduced their own visit
rate only by about 25% while waiting for their partner to feed the
young, leading to a frequency of alternation of 72%. Thus, even if
one accepts that parental coordinationmay indeed help to resolve
conflict over care, there is a clear discrepancy between observed
behavior and that predicted by the model.
At least two other potential influences on turn-taking are
also overlooked by the Johnstone et al. model. Firstly, when
turn-taking is strict, parental visit rates are constrained to be
identical for the members of a pair, yet there is abundant
evidence of differences in investment between mates, driven by
variation in extra-pair paternity and adult sex ratio (Kokko and
Jennions, 2012; Liker et al., 2015), sex-biased dispersal (Kuijper
and Johnstone, 2017), or task specialization (Iserbyt et al., 2017).
Does the notion of turn-taking still make sense when investment
is asymmetric, and can models help to predict how patterns of
parental coordination vary when the sexes differ in their division
of care roles or in the costs and benefits of care? Secondly, the
assumption that parents incur only personal costs during care
is violated whenever individuals stand to gain if their partner
survives to the next breeding attempt (Mariette and Griffith,
2015). If finding a new partner is costly (Johnstone and Bshary,
2008; Song and Feldman, 2013), or if familiar partners are more
effective or efficient at rearing offspring (Black, 2001; Sánchez-
Macouzet et al., 2014; Wiley and Ridley, 2018), individuals are
also impacted by costs incurred by their partner, and hence
might be expected to adopt a more forgiving turn-taking strategy.
Under the extreme case of “true” monogamy, in which the death
of either individual ends reproduction for the survivor, costs of
care are entirely shared and there is no sexual conflict.
Here, we explore whether turn-taking strategies are robust
when parents monitor one another’s behavior with less than
perfect accuracy, and whether a more realistic model can
account for the kind of “imperfect” alternation observed in
empirical studies. We extend the simple model of Johnstone
et al. (2014) to incorporate, successively, (i) imperfect monitoring
of partner visits, (ii) time-dependent costs and benefits of care,
(iii) differences between partners in payoffs (and consequently in
behavior), (iv) differences between partners in the accuracy with
which they can monitor one another’s behavior, and (v) shared
costs of care.
MODELING PARENTAL TURN-TAKING
In the model of Johnstone et al. (2014), two parents stay together
for the time required to raise their offspring, during which they
make repeated visits to provision their brood of young. Each
parent can monitor the other’s behavior with perfect accuracy,
and visits randomly at rate λf or λm (for the female or male
parent, respectively) when its partner was the last to visit the
young, and at rate µf or µm when it was itself the last to visit
the young. The system thus switches back and forth between
two states, defined by the identity of the last parent to visit
(see Figure 1, upper panel), with the visit rates of each parent
changing accordingly. Each parent’s payoff is equal to the sum
of (i) fitness gained from the current brood, which is given by
a smoothly increasing, concave function of the total mean visit
rate of both parents together, f (xf + xm), where xf and xm
denotemean visit rate of the female andmale parent, respectively,
and (ii) fitness gained from future broods, which is given by a
smoothly decreasing, concave function of the focal parent’s own
individual mean visit rate, g(xf ) or g(xm). The benefits and costs
of care are assumed to be identical for both parents. Assuming
that the benefits of care are not too small compared to the costs,
this model yields a convergently unstable equilibrium, at which
λf = λm = µf = µm > 0, and two convergently stable equilibria
(see Figure 1, lower panel, and Supplementary Information for
further details). At one of these two equilbria, λf = λm = 0
and µf = µm > 0, implying that biparental care breaks down
(i.e., one parent gives up on care entirely; Beissinger and Snyder,
1987); at the other equilibrium, µf = µm = 0 and λf = λm > 0,
implying that after feeding the young once, a parent will not feed
again until its partner has visited in turn, which leads to strictly
alternating visits. The latter, “turn taking” equilibrium, features
an “efficient” level of investment at which the parents both visit
at a rate that maximizes their total joint payoff.
Imperfect Monitoring
Here, we extend the above model to allow for imperfect
monitoring of partner behavior (and, subsequently, for time-
dependent costs and benefits, asymmetries between parents in
the benefits and costs of care, and cost-sharing). We suppose a
focal parent detects each visit by its partner with probability df or
dm (for the female or male parent, respectively); with probability
(1− df ) or (1−dm) the visit goes undetected. As a result, the pair
at any given moment may be in one of three informational states
(see Figure 2, upper panel): (i) both parents may be aware that
the female was last to visit the young, (ii) both parents may be
aware that the male was last to visit the young, or (iii) each parent
may believe it was itself the last to visit the young (a situation
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FIGURE 1 | Structure of the model of Johnstone et al. (2014) (upper panel),
and the direction of selection for an illustrative case (lower panel) in which
λf = λm = λ and µf = µm = µ, the fitness gained from the current brood is
given by f (xf + xm) = 1− Exp(−xf − xm), where xf and xm denote mean
female and male visit rates, respectively, and the expected fitness a parents
gains from future broods is given by g(xf ) = K xf
2 or g(xf ) = K – xm
2. Blue
arrows show the direction of selection for a population characterized by
particular values of λ and µ, thick curves represent the null-clines for λ (solid
curve) and µ (dashed curves), along which the selection gradient for the trait in
question is zero, while empty and filled circles denote convergently unstable
and stable equilibria, respectively.
we refer to as one of “conflicting information”). The last of these
states can only arise when a parent visits unobserved. In the
Supplementary Informationwe derive the expected proportions
of time that a pair spends in each of these three states, and from
these the mean visit rates and fitness payoffs to each parent.
To explore the implications of imperfect monitoring for the
evolution of visit rates, we begin by treating the model as a
symmetric game, in which parents of both sexes experience
precisely equivalent costs and benefits of feeding, and are
assumed to adopt the same strategy (λf = λm = λ, µf =
µm = µ); below, we also explore asymmetries in costs, benefits
and behavior. As illustrated in Figure 2, lower panel, imperfect
l
l
l
−
−−
−
FIGURE 2 | Structure of the “imperfect monitoring” model described in the
main text, which incorporates the possibility that either parent may fail to
detect visits by the other (upper panel), and adaptive dynamics for an
illustrative case (lower panel) in which λf = λm = λ, µf = µm = µ,
df = dm = 0.8 (with payoffs as specified in the legend to Figure 1). Blue
arrows show the direction of the selection gradient for a population
characterized by particular values of λ and µ, thick curves represent the
null-clines for λ (solid curve) and µ (dashed curves), while empty and filled
circles denote convergently unstable and stable equilibria, respectively.
monitoring results in dramatic consequences for the outcome
of the symmetric game. As in the original perfect assessment
model, the new model incorporating missed detections features
a convergently unstable equilibrium at which λ = µ > 0,
and a convergently stable equilibrium at which λ = 0 and
µ > 0, implying that biparental care breaks down. However,
there is no longer a stable equilibrium featuring alternating visits
(as can be seen in the figure, there is no intersection between
the λ and µ null-clines within the region for which λ > µ).
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Rather, when there is a tendency for parents to alternate, selection
favors indefinitely increasing values of λ, and decreasing values
of µ, leading to increasingly rapid “flurries” of alternating visits
separated by ever longer gaps during which neither parent feeds.
This outcome arises because a parent’s mean visit rate depends
upon both λ and µ. It is thus always possible for an individual to
maintain the same overall mean visit rate while simultaneously
increasing its own value of λ and decreasing its own value of
µ (such that the two effects cancel out). This leaves the focal
individual’s own investment unchanged, but (assuming λ > µ)
encourages the focal’s partner to feed the young more frequently,
by reducing the proportion of time during which the partner is
waiting for the focal to visit.
Time-Dependent Costs and Benefits
The above analysis suggests that imperfect monitoring of partner
behavior leads to the breakdown of alternation. However, this
outcome relies on the simplistic assumption of the original model
that payoffs depend only on mean parental visit rates, and are
unaffected by the temporal distribution of visits. In reality, an
outcome such as the one described (in which visits become
increasingly clumped in time) will entail fitness costs, since
offspring are likely to become satiated during bursts of frequent
feeding, and risk starving during periods in which neither parent
visits. In addition, phases of frequent feeding are likely to increase
costs to parents who may be unable to feed themselves while
repeatedly feeding the young at a high rate.
To better capture the fitness costs of clumped feeding visits,
we can therefore introduce time-dependent costs and benefits of
feeding.We suppose that the cost to a parent of feeding the young
decreases exponentially with time since its last feeding visit, with
the rate of exponential decay denoted rf or rm for the female or
male parent. Conversely, the benefit to the young increases with
time since they were last fed, approaching an asymptotic value
exponentially, with rate coefficient h (see Figure 3).
To implement these time-dependent costs and benefits,
we introduce two new state variables. We will suppose that
immediately after feeding, a parent enters a “refractory” state in
which further feeding visits incur a cost. The parent, however,
spontaneously reverts at rate rf or rm to a “ready” state in which
feeding visits are cost-free. The probability of incurring a cost
when feeding thus declines exponentially with time since the
parent’s last visit (giving an expected cost function similar to
that illustrated in Figure 3) and overall, the loss of fitness from
future broods that a parent suffers is proportional to its long-
term average rate of visiting while in a refractory state. Similarly,
we will suppose that after being fed, the young enter a “satiated”
state in which further feeding provides no benefit. The offspring,
however, spontaneously revert at rate h to a “hungry” state in
which feeding is once again beneficial. The probability of gaining
from a feeding visit thus increases with time since the last feed,
approaching an asymptote of 1 exponentially (giving an expected
benefit function similar to that illustrated in Figure 3), and
overall, fitness gained through the current brood is proportional
to the long-term average rate of visits made (by either parent)
while the young are in a “hungry” state.
l
−
FIGURE 3 | Time dependent costs and benefits of feeding. Blue curves show
the benefit to the young of receiving a feed (relative to the maximum possible
benefit), as a function of the time since they were last fed, for three different
values of h (solid blue curve, h = 2; dashed blue curve, h = 1; dotted blue
curve, h = 0.5). Red curves show the cost to a parent of delivering a feed
(relative to the maximum possible cost) as a function of the time since it last
fed, assuming that rf = rm = r, for three different values of r (solid red curve,
r = 0.5; dashed red curve, r = 1; dotted red curve, r = 2).
Note that in this version of the model, a parent’s fitness
payoff is simply equal to a weighted sum of benefits (B), given
by the mean rate of visits (by either parent) while the young
are hungry and costs (Cf or Cm), given by the rate of visits
by the focal parent while it is in a refractory state. We do
not need to invoke concave payoff functions f (xf + xm) and
g(xf ) or g(xm) because the time-dependent costs and benefits
of individual visits themselves ensure that increases in feeding
rate yield diminishing returns – as parents feed more often, visits
follow more rapidly one after another, thus occurring more often
when the young are satiated or the parents in a refractory state.
In addition, payoffs are also sensitive to the temporal distribution
of visits as well as simple mean visit rates. A more evenly spaced
visit pattern yields a higher payoff than one in which visits are
temporally clumped, again because the latter increases the chance
that parents visit when in a refractory state or when the young
are satiated.
In the Supplementary Information we derive the expected
costs and benefits of feeding given the above assumptions, which
allow one to determine equilibrium visit rates and resulting levels
of alternation, which we illustrate and discuss below. As before,
we first treat themodel as a symmetrical game in which both sexes
experience precisely equivalent costs and benefits of feeding (so
that rf = rm = r), and are assumed to adopt the same strategy
(λf = λm = λ, µf = µm = µ), before going on to explore
asymmetries in costs, benefits and behavior.
Figure 4 shows the adaptive dynamics of the symmetrical
game. The graph reveals that incorporating time-dependent costs
and benefits of feeding restores the “turn-taking” equilibrium
that was eliminated by the introduction of imperfect monitoring.
As in the original model of Johnstone et al. (2014), we
see a convergently unstable equilibrium lying between two
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FIGURE 4 | Adaptive dynamics of the extended model described in the main
text, when the costs and benefits of feeding are time-dependent, for an
illustrative symmetrical case in which λf = λm = λ, µf = µm = µ, with
df = dm = 0.8, h = 1 and rf = rm = 0.2. The fitness payoff to a parent is
equal to bB− cCf or bB− cCm, where B denotes the mean rate at which
offspring receive feeds while hungry and Cf or Cm the mean rate at which the
female or male parent visits the young while in a refractory state, with b = 1
and c = 0.2. Blue arrows show the direction of the selection gradient for a
population characterized by particular values of λ and µ, thick curves
represent the null-clines for λ (solid curve) and µ (dashed curves), while empty
and filled circles denote convergently unstable and stable equilibria,
respectively. The gray-filled red circle represents the equilibrium outcome of
the model when parents cannot respond to one another’s visits (i.e., under the
constraint that λ = µ).
convergently stable equilibria, at one of which λ = 0 andµ > 0,
implying that biparental care breaks down, while at the other,
λ > µ > 0, implying that after feeding the young, a parent
slows down its rate of return until it perceives its partner to have
visited in turn. Unlike in the original model, however, this latter
equilibrium does not feature perfect turn-taking. Since µ > 0,
while a parent speeds up after it perceives its partner to have
visited the young, and slows down after visiting itself, it does not
“refuse” entirely to make repeated visits (a resolution that makes
adaptive sense, as such a refusal would lead to cessation of all care
whenever one parent failed to observe the other’s visit).
Also shown in Figure 4 (as a red, shaded circle) is
the equilibrium of the model when parents are constrained
to ignore one another’s visits (i.e. when λ and µ are
constrained to be equal). In the original analysis of Johnstone
et al. (shown in Figure 1), and in the extension featuring
imperfect monitoring described above (shown in Figure 2), this
constrained equilibrium coincided precisely with the unstable
equilibrium of the unconstrained model (which is why it was
not visible in Figures 1 or 2). The implication is that in those
models, the initial evolution of responsiveness in a population
of unresponsive parents could equally well lead toward turn-
taking or toward a breakdown of parental care (because the
constrained equilibrium fell on the boundary between two basins
of attraction). However, as Figure 4 reveals, the introduction
of time-dependent costs and benefits shifts the position of the
unstable equilibrium such that the constrained equilibrium now
falls into the basin of attraction of the turn-taking equilibrium.
When the benefits of feeding the young increase with the time
since they were last visited, while the costs of feeding decrease
with the time since a parent last fed, selection favors an initial
tendency to slow down after visiting the young and speed up
after the partner visits in turn, even if the partner does not itself
respond in the same way, because this serves to ensure a more
even distribution of visits by the focal parent. It is thus easier
to explain the initial evolution of turn-taking in a model with
time-dependent costs and benefits.
Figure 5 shows how the equilibrium values of λ and µ at the
turn-taking equilibrium change with the probability of detecting
a partner’s visit, and the consequences for overall mean visit rate
(which is identical for both parents in this symmetrical case)
and for the proportion of alternated vs. repeat visits. The graph
reveals that as the probability of detection drops, the sensitivity of
feeding rates to partner behavior, and the consequent proportion
of alternated visits, also decline rapidly. However, the equilibrium
remains stable even in the face of frequent missed detections,
with parents slowing down and speeding up to some degree
in response to own and partner visits, yielding a frequency
of alternation that is less than 100% but nevertheless greater
than would otherwise be expected by chance. The greater the
accuracy of detection, and the more precisely the parents are
able to alternate visits, the greater the overall mean visit rate at
equilibrium, highlighting the benefits of turn-taking in resolving
the conflict between parents over investment in care.
One complication to bear inmind for testing these predictions
empirically is that λ denotes feeding rate when the partner is
perceived to have visited last. A well-informed, human observer
attempting to measure these visit rates, however, is more likely
to calculate them based on the identity of the last parent actually
to visit, as it may prove difficult to infer whether or not a focal
parent perceived its partner’s last feed. As shown in Figure 5, the
mean feeding rate after a partner visits (whether the focal parent
detected this visit or not), denoted λobs, is lower than the rate after
a partner is perceived to visit, precisely because the visit may have
been overlooked, so that the focal parent continues to feed at the
lower rate µ. However, the difference is slight and the qualitative
pattern of results unchanged, regardless of whether one focuses
on λ or λobs.
Asymmetries in Costs and Benefits
Next, we explore the consequences of introducing asymmetries
between males and females in the fitness consequences
of care, and allowing for differences in feeding behavior
between parents. Because it is difficult to illustrate adaptive
dynamics in the asymmetric case (with four evolving visit
rates, λf , λm, µf and µm), we simply focus on how the
strategies at the “turn-taking” equilibrium vary with the relevant
model parameters.
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FIGURE 5 | Changes in the equilibrium alternating strategy, for the illustrative
symmetrical case considered in Figure 4, as one varies the probability d of
detecting a partner’s visits (assuming that this is the same for both parents,
i.e., that df = dm = d); other parameter values and payoffs are as specified in
the legend to Figure 4. The upper panel shows the equilibrium values of λ (a
focal individual’s visit rate immediately after it detects a visit by its partner),
plotted in blue, and µ (a focal individual’s visit rate immediately after visiting the
young itself), plotted in red, as a function of the probability of detecting a
partner’s visits (d); also shown is λobs, a focal individual’s visit rate immediately
after a fully-informed human observer records a visit by its partner (allowing for
the possibility that the focal individual itself may fail to detect the partner’s visit).
The lower panel shows the resulting overall mean visit rate by a parent, plotted
in blue, and the proportion of alternated visits, plotted in green, again as a
function of the probability of detecting a partner’s visits (d).
Figure 6 illustrates how changes in the recovery rate
parameter of a focal parent, r1 (which determines how rapidly the
cost of feeding decays after a visit) affect the strategy of the focal
parent and that of its partner, while holding the latter’s recovery
rate r2 constant (note that asymmetries in the relative weighting
of benefits and costs when calculating the overall payoff to
either parent have qualitatively similar effects to asymmetries in
recovery rate, and so are not illustrated in the main text; see
Supplementary Information for additional results). The figure
shows that as the focal parent’s recovery rate increases, it visits at
a higher rate, while the partner compensates for this change by
reducing its own visit rate. Both individuals, however, continue
to respond to one another’s behavior, speeding up after the
l
l
FIGURE 6 | Changes in the stable alternating strategy, as one varies a focal
parent’s recovery rate independently of its partner’s recovery rate (i.e., allowing
for asymmetries between the parents). Solid curves show the visit rates of the
focal parent, λ1 (immediately after it detects a visit by its partner) in blue and
µ1 (immediately after visiting the young itself) in red, while dashed curves show
the corresponding visit rates of the partner, λ2 in blue and µ2 in red, all as a
function of the focal parent’s recovery rate r1 (while holding the partner’s
recovery rate r2 constant at a value of 0.4). As in Figures 4, 5, the fitness
payoff to a parent is equal to bB− cCf or bB− cCm, where B denotes the
mean rate at which offspring receive feeds while hungry and Cf or Cm the
mean rate at which the female or male parent visits the young while in a
refractory state, with b = 1 and c = 0.2. Other parameter values are
df = dm = 0.9 and h = 1.
partner visits and slowing down after they visit themselves, thus
maintaining alternation.
Figure 7 shows the consequences of these strategic changes
for mean visit rates (upper panel), and for the proportion of
alternated visits (lower panel). As the upper panel makes clear,
compensation for changes in a partner’s visit rate is incomplete.
An increase in the focal parent’s recovery rate, for instance, is
associated with a decrease in the partner’s visit rate, but the
latter effect is smaller in magnitude than the former, so that
overall mean visit rate (by both parents combined) increases with
either parent’s recovery rate. When parents differ in visit rate
(due to differences in their recovery rate) the parent that visits
more frequently makes more repeat visits, while the parent that
visits less frequently makes more alternated visits. The overall
proportion of alternated visits, however, is much less sensitive
to differences between parents. Alternation is most pronounced
when parents work equally hard, but decreases only slowly as
asymmetries are introduced.
Asymmetries in Accuracy of Monitoring
As well as asymmetries in the costs and benefits of care, we can
also allow for asymmetries in the accuracy with which partners
can monitor one another’s behavior. Figure 8 (upper panel)
shows how changes in the accuracy of monitoring by a focal
parent, d1, affects the strategy of the focal parent and that of
its partner, while holding the latter’s accuracy d2 constant at a
value of 0.5; the lower panel of the figure shows the impact on
overall mean visit rates by the focal parent, its partner, and by
Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution | www.frontiersin.org 6 October 2019 | Volume 7 | Article 335
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FIGURE 7 | Changes in the overall mean visit rates and proportion of
alternated visits by both parents, as one varies a focal parent’s recovery rate
independently of its partner’s recovery rate (i.e., allowing for asymmetries
between the parents). The upper panel shows the overall mean visit rate of the
focal parent (solid blue curve) and of its partner (dashed blue curve), as well as
the total mean visit rate (green curve), as a function of the focal parent’s
recovery rate r1 (while holding the partner’s recovery rate r2 constant at a value
of 0.4). The lower panel shows the proportion of alternated visits by the focal
parent (solid blue curve) and by its partner (dashed blue curve), as well as the
total proportion of alternated visits by both parents (green curve), again as a
function of the focal parent’s recovery rate r1. Other parameter values and
payoffs are as specified in the legend to Figure 6.
both parents together. The figure reveals that as the focal parent’s
accuracy improves, its visit rates decrease relative to those of its
partner. As result, the parent who can monitor its partner more
accurately works less hard (while total visit rates increase, albeit
slightly, with the accuracy of either parent).
Cost-Sharing Between Parents
Finally, we briefly investigate how turn-taking strategies change
when individual costs of care incurred by either parent also
reduce the fitness of the other. This kind of “cost-sharing” will
apply whenever individuals benefit from their partner surviving
to the following breeding season. We introduce a parameter z
that specifies the degree of cost-sharing, such that the female
parent incurs fitness costs of care equal to zCf + (1 − z)Cm,
and the male zCm + (1 − z)Cf . A value of z = 0 recovers
l
FIGURE 8 | Changes in the stable alternating strategy (upper panel), and in
overall mean visit rates (lower panel), as one varies a focal parent’s probability
of detecting its partner’s visits (d1), while holding the latter’s probability of
detection d2 constant at a value of 0.5. In the upper panel, solid curves show
the visit rates of the focal parent, λ1 (immediately after it detects a visit by its
partner) in blue and µ1 (immediately after visiting the young itself) in red, while
dashed curves show the corresponding visit rates of the partner, λ2 in blue
and µ2 in red. In the lower panel, the solid blue curve shows the mean visit
rate of the focal parent and the dashed blue curve the mean visit rate of its
partner, while the green curve shows the total mean visit rate by the pair.
Payoffs are as specified in the legend to Figure 6, with other parameter values
r1 = r2 = 0.4 and h = 1.
the results above, with costs borne by a parent reflecting only its
own efforts, while the opposite extreme of z = 0.5 implies that
costs are shared equally by both parents, as in a systemwith “true”
monogamy in which there is no sexual conflict because the death
of either individual ends reproduction for the survivor (Lessells,
2006).
Figure 9 shows how parental visit rates and the proportion
of alternated visits vary with cost-sharing under symmetric
parental care (upper panel), and also how the inequality in
parental contributions changes with cost-sharing when parents
differ in their recovery rate (lower panel). The figure reveals
that turn-taking becomes less strict as cost-sharing becomes
more pronounced, with individuals becoming less responsive to
their partner and the proportion of alternated visits decreasing.
The overall visit rate increases as costs are shared to a greater
extent, reflecting the decrease in conflict between carers, and the
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FIGURE 9 | Impact of cost sharing on turn-taking. The upper panel shows, for
an illustrative symmetrical case in which parents do not differ from one another,
the mean visit rate per parent (in blue) and proportion of alternated visits (in
green) as a function of the extent of cost sharing (z), for three different values of
d, the probability of detecting a partner’s visists (d = 0.95, solid curves;
d = 0.85, dashed curves; d = 0.7, dotted curves). Other parameter values are
b = 1, c = 0.2, h = 1, and r = 0.2. The lower panel shows, for an illustrative
asymmetrical case in which parent 1 enjoys a recovery rate r1 = 0.4 that is
higher than that of the second parent r2 = 0.2, the ratio of mean parental visit
rates (x1/x2), again as a function of the extent of cost sharing (z), for the same
three values of d. Other parameter values are as specified for the upper panel.
inequality in parental contributions becomes more pronounced
when parents differ in their ability to provide care, with the parent
that accrues lower costs taking on an increasing fraction of the
effort of care, and investing more overall.
DISCUSSION
Our model suggests that turn-taking is a robust form of
conditional cooperation that can help to resolve conflicts over
parental care, even in cases where parents cannot monitor one
another’s contributions with perfect accuracy, and/or where
parents differ in their individual ability to provide care. However,
this finding is contingent on the assumption that the costs and
benefits of care events are time-dependent, with a given care
event being more valuable to offspring and less costly to parents
when further separated in time from the previous event. We also
find that turn-taking strategies become less strict when the costs
of care are shared between parents, suggesting—perhaps counter-
intuitively—that when sexual conflict is weaker care may appear
less coordinated.
Under imperfect monitoring, the strict turn-taking rule
predicted by Johnstone et al. (2014) is replaced by a more
forgiving rule in which a parent decreases its visit rate after
visiting the young itself (but does not cease to visit entirely),
and increases its visit rate after the partner is observed to
visit again. This prediction aligns with results from empirical
studies showing elevated but imperfect alternation of carer
visits (Bebbington and Hatchwell, 2016; Koenig and Walters,
2016; Savage et al., 2017), assuming such patterns are driven
by responsiveness rather than environmental effects that affect
both parents (Ihle et al., 2019; Santema et al., 2019). In natural
systems the difficulty of accurately monitoring one’s partner
varies with aspects of ecology and behavior, and is (for example)
likely to be lower in more open habitats, when food items are
less variable, and when individuals cannot false-feed (Boland
et al., 1997). Consequently, we should anticipate more strict
turn-taking rules under these conditions, and weaker rules when
monitoring is difficult. In extreme cases, individuals might have
little or no ability to monitor their partner’s contributions, except
indirectly via offspring condition, and under these circumstances
individuals should contribute care at a rate that does not
change with partner visits. Conversely, we should expect stricter
turn-taking when environmental factors incentivise partners to
associate with each other in space, allowing them to monitor
each other more easily at no cost; for example if pairs forage
more efficiently due to increased vigilance, or if visiting offspring
together lowers predation risk on the young (Raihani et al., 2010).
Our results also help to reconcile turn-taking models with
classical models of parental care. There appears to be a
tension between the two, because turn-taking involves positive
(matching) responses to partner effort: a parent reduces its own
visit rate after it has visited the nest, but speeds up again once the
partner has visited in turn, so that greater visit rates by the latter
encourage greater visit rates by the former. In contrast, classical
models generally predict negative (compensatory) responses to
changes in partner effort (Houston and Davies, 1985; McNamara
et al., 1999; Johnstone, 2011; Lessells and McNamara, 2012) at
least when parents are similarly informed about offspring need
(Johnstone and Hinde, 2006). In our turn-taking model, while
individuals respond to each visit by their partner with a matching
response, when costs are asymmetric an individual’s total visit
rate is lower when its partner visits more, and higher when
its partner visits less (see Figures 6, 7), recovering the classical
prediction of incomplete compensation to changes in partner
effort that is broadly supported by the empirical literature on
biparental care (Harrison et al., 2009). Our analysis thus suggests
that one might expect to observe different patterns of response
at different time-scales, with “visit-by-visit” matching shifting to
compensation over longer periods of time.
As well as asymmetries in the cost of care, our model allows
us to explore the impact of asymmetries between parents in
their ability to monitor partner behavior. As shown in Figure 8,
we find that the parent that can monitor its partner’s behavior
with greater accuracy provides the smaller share of total care,
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while its partner ends up shouldering a greater burden. There
is thus a benefit to be gained from better information about
partner behavior, which might favor monitoring even where this
entails costs. The more reliably a focal parent can detect visits
by its partner, and adjust its own visit rate in response, the more
effective is this strategy of conditional cooperation in eliciting
greater effort by the partner (and the more the focal parent can
afford to reduce its own efforts in compensation).
Our finding that time-dependency of the costs and benefits
of care is required for stability of turn-taking under imperfect
monitoring implies that parental investment rules are likely to
be sensitive to the details of offspring demand and resource
allocation. It is reasonable to assume that parental visits will
often increase in value with time since a previous visit, as
repeated visits might satiate offspring, and long periods without
feeding could lead to starvation or affect development. However,
this assumption is most plausible for parents rearing a single
offspring; by contrast, when parents rear multiple offspring,
sibling rivalry and dominance hierarchies will influence the
optimal patterns of care by parents (Mock and Parker, 1997), and
our assumptions may no longer hold. In particular, the form of
time-dependency implemented in our model is less well suited
to cases in which (a) there are many offspring with a strong
dominance hierarchy, (b) parents visit at a low rate, (c) parents
deliver single food items that can be monopolized by offspring,
and (d) offspring control food allocation (Mock and Parker, 1997;
Krebs, 2002). In such circumstances, rapid bouts of investment
by parents are likely to result in a greater payoff through a
reduction in sibling competition (Shen et al., 2010), and we
would expect less strict turn-taking. Similarly, our assumption
that visiting in rapid succession is more costly to a parent is
most plausible in species where parents must regularly feed
themselves, and in environments where food items are indivisible
and distributed homogeneously.
Our prediction that alternation should decrease when parents’
costs are shared makes sense when one views turn-taking as a
way of policing a partner with conflicting interests. As parents
increasingly benefit from the survival of their partner (and the
bond between them) beyond the present breeding attempt, they
should increasingly optimize costs and benefits for the pair
rather than the individual (Mariette and Griffith, 2015). When
parental interests are fully aligned, there is no risk of exploitation
and hence parents can “trust” that their partner is investing
appropriately based on their individual costs. In other words, a
strategy of conditional cooperation is pointless when partners
unconditionally cooperate. Under asymmetric costs, any degree
of cost-sharing results in the partner that can provide care at
lower cost taking on a greater share of investment, and although
we do not explicitlymodelmultiple dimensions of care this would
logically lead to greater task specialization if the asymmetry is
reversed for other care modes. Although we have framed this
discussion in terms of a bi-parental pair bond, this cost-sharing
argument applies equally to cooperative systems in which carers
are influenced by costs incurred by other carers. For example,
when individuals do better in larger groups (Kokko et al., 2001),
philopatric group members will benefit from every other group
member surviving, unless they stand to inherit that member’s
breeding position.
The stability of the “turn-taking” equilibrium, even under
imperfect detection and asymmetries between carers, can be
viewed as another example of the effectiveness of retaliatory
strategies in reaching an efficient outcome between individuals
that repeatedly interact under a conflict of interest. Similarly to
the successful tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy in the iterated Prisoners’
dilemma (Axelrod, 1984), adopting a turn-taking strategy during
care allows individuals to punish a defecting partner and
effectively work with a cooperative partner. As with TFT, the
strict turn-taking strategy of Johnstone et al. (2014) is not stable
when individuals cannot perfectly monitor their partner, as a
mistake or misperception leads to a failure to revisit, analogous
in result to the joint retaliatory defection in TFT. However, our
model illustrates that just as under noisy conditions forgiving
strategies such as generous TFT, or one-step memory strategies
such as tit-for-two-tats and contrite TFT can outperform strict
TFT (Boerlijst et al., 1997), when parents imperfectly detect each
other’s contributions to care, an imperfect turn-taking strategy is
likewise the best response.
While our model is more flexible than previous theory on
turn-taking, it is still limited to circumstances under which
both parents are free to modify their visit rates, and care is
delivered in discrete units. In some cases, care is delivered
over a period of time and parents are constrained to strictly
alternate contributions to care, for example when one parent
must remain at a nest to incubate or defend offspring. In
these cases, rather than altering visit rates, individuals may
mediate the duration of bouts by signaling to one another
(Boucaud et al., 2017; Takahashi et al., 2017). In addition, our
model only considers a single dimension of parental investment
delivered during a single stage, while previous work has suggested
that sex-based asymmetries across modes of care (Barta et al.,
2014) or across care stages (Savage et al., 2013; Iserbyt et al.,
2017) can strongly influence the resulting behavioral rules
and outcomes for offspring. We also ignore the possibility
of death or desertion of one partner part-way through the
period of care, as well as changes in parental behavior with
chick age.
Our model makes a number of predictions about conditions
under which one might expect stricter or less strict turn-
taking during parental care, and we encourage comparative and
experimental tests of these predictions. Even the existence of
active turn-taking during parental care remains contentious, as
the analysis methods and null models used by prior empirical
studies leave open the possibility that the observed turn-taking
is a result of environmental influences that drive correlated
changes in parental visit rate on the scale of individual care events
(Ihle et al., 2019; Santema et al., 2019). Future studies should
carefully manipulate short-term parental investment (Santema
et al., 2017), the ability to monitor partner investment (Iserbyt
et al., 2015), or cost asymmetries within pairs (Firth et al.,
2015) to create a more complete picture of the degree to which
parents respond to each other, under what contexts, and at what
temporal scale.
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